Wimps, who lack
the strength of will to win today or who whine about the plight of people
who lose out in the contest
Journalism professor Jack Lule conducted a systematic analysis of major
news stories from the New York Times in the 1990s, and of the seven
archetypal story patterns he found, all but one fall into the pattern identified
above, suggesting that Americans were resonating to the Hero plot during
that period. With the exception of several stories about the Good Mother
that seem to be related to cultural expectations about women, the articles
all focus on archetypal characters and situations typical of the Hero plot.
Lule particularly highlights stories with both a Hero and a Victim. His
archetypes of the Scapegoat, the Trickster (his news story example is Mike
Tyson’s rape trial), and the Other (Evil) World all are versions of
enemies. His archetype of the Flood (meaning any natural disaster) is one
case of the difficulties the Hero surmounts.
An additional challenge that we as citizens face is that our news is being
fed to us by the media consistently through the lens of the Hero/Warrior
archetype. Unless we can correct for this, we will not be able to hold our
politicians accountable for acting in ways that might solve problems that
do not fit this plot. The results are often not pretty.
The Hero Trance in the Vietnam Era
Surfacing this unconscious operating system in the groupthink within the
U.S. explains some of the most important failures of our foreign policy.
In the documentary The Fog of War (widely available on DVD), former
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara reflects on the story the U.S. was
telling itself that got us bogged down in Vietnam. He argues that our leaders
saw what they believed, not what actually was happening. In fact, he claims
that the attack on a U.S. Navy ship that led to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
and the first bombings of North Vietnam likely was not an attack at all.
More importantly, the administration’s view that the North Vietnamese
were pawns of Communist China simply was inaccurate. McNamara maintains
that our belief in the domino theory was so strong and our real knowledge
of the North Vietnamese so meager that we misread the situation, with devastating
results for Vietnam and for our own country.
In archetypal terms, the domino theory was the Hero (us against them) plot
of the time. This us/them thinking caused us to engage in questionable activities,
because we tended to support anyone, however oppressive, who was anti-communist
and fight any group who called themselves communists. Similarly, we helped
to train Osama bin Laden and his ilk to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan,
never thinking that eventually he would turn and use what he learned from
us—on us.
Of course, not everyone in the 1960s and 1970s was in Hero trance—hence
the protests against the war. Many intellectuals recognized the real complexity
of the situation, demonstrating the clarity of mind of the Sage archetype.
Many younger protesters, in fact, carried signs announcing a more surprising,
competing archetype (the Lover), saying, “Make love, not war.”
Eventually, the sheer weight of evidence, along with the emergence of these
counter-archetypal forces, caused the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam.
But now, the Hero trance seems to have grabbed the American people by the
neck once more—or, at least, it has grabbed the Bush administration
and the media. So once again we are mired down in a war that is clearly
a mistake, if we are to take seriously the reasons President Bush gave us
for invading Iraq. No weapons of mass destruction have been found, nor any
connections to al Qaeda, except ones now forged by Iraqi resistance to the
American occupation. How could this be happening? And, how is it that Senator
Kerry’s opposition to the Vietnam War, following his heroic service
in it, is now being painted as unpatriotic or even traitorous? What happened?
Are we so lacking in cognitive complexity, as Robert Kegan fears, that we
escape into simple answers? And, do we, as Chris Hedges suggests, so desperately
need to identify as the “good guys” that we retreat into war
psychology rather than grapple with thinking about why others in the world
might hate us?
The Bush Administration and the Hero Trance
We can see the Hero archetype at work in the Bush administration in a very
pure but trance-like way. When the nation was in shock after 9/11, most
Americans were asking questions about the terrorists: Who are they? Why
do they hate us? What are they seeking to gain?
These questions reflected real cognitive complexity, the kind Professor
Kegan says we need to survive in the modern world. But almost immediately,
Bush defined the situation for us, telling us that we were at war with the
terrorists, that they were evil, and that they attacked us because they
hated freedom. He then challenged the world to support our side, saying
that other countries were either with us (Heroic allies), or against us
(our enemies).
Complexity of thinking would require us to truly grapple with questions
about how to protect the nation from terrorists. Fighting terrorism is not
like traditional warfare. Terrorists are not from any one country, so there
is no single place to invade. They do not wear uniforms, so you do not know
whom you are fighting. The paradigm simply is different than what our military
was trained to respond to.
Other cases of terrorism—the Oklahoma City bombing, for example—have
been treated as crimes, which involves a different way of thinking than
does war. If we had chosen this path, it would invite cooperation from other
countries, many of which are engaged in keeping their own people free from
terrorists as well. It also would encourage us to learn from countries with
more experience fighting terror than we have had.
Once we were “at war,” the predictable, but largely irrational
pattern of behavior was evoked. While it was logical to invade Afghanistan,
to go after Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, it was not at all logical to substitute
Saddam Hussein as public enemy number one, other than the fact that the
Bush administration had always planned to depose him. In trance, you do
not fit your actions to the situation, you impose your plot, whether it
fits or not. And, you expect outcomes that seem logical because they fit
the narrative, but end up being revealed as erroneous. For example, senior
administration officials predicted that the Iraqi people (the victims) would
greet us as great liberators, that they would love us and pay for the war
with their oil. Long after Bush had his photo-op declaring “Mission
Accomplished,” the resistance to the U.S. occupation continued to
mount, and with it, casualties on all sides.
Kegan points out that cognitive complexity is different from intelligence.
You can be very smart but still lack complexity in your thinking. Many people
demean Bush’s intelligence, but he clearly would not be so popular
if he did not know how to assess situations and influence people. However,
the Hero story implicitly focuses intelligence in a narrow and preordained
way. Within the story, people can be extremely strategic and clever, but
they will miss much of what is going on. To them, complex thinking appears
as a weakness.
How Trance Breeds Tony Soprano Ethics
While the healthy Hero fights for the people and tends to be very honest
and truth telling, the Hero in trance has a more ruthless quality. We can
see this in a too-quick willingness to bomb cities and injure or kill civilians,
or in character attacks on one’s political opponents (e.g., Bush’s
refusal to repudiate unsubstantiated attacks on John Kerry by the Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth, or his distortion of Kerry’s distinguished
war and Senate record to paint him as soft, a fake, a flip-flopper—in
short, a wimp).
A recent article in the Washington Post ascribed the Swift Boat
Veterans for Truth’s attacks to a desire for revenge against Kerry
for his testimony before the Senate after his return from Vietnam. In their
view, by opposing the war and relating atrocity stories he’d been
told, he broke the soldier’s code of honor, a code that requires veterans
to hang together, showing loyalty, no matter what.
It struck me that this is an example of Tony Soprano ethics. On the TV show
The Sopranos, Tony and the other mobsters see extortion and drug
dealing simply as the way they make their living. To them, it is not immoral.
Yet, they live by a code that tells them never to rat on one another; the
punishment for doing so is death, which they enforce without question. I’m
not suggesting that U.S. soldiers are in the same category as the Mafia,
but I do maintain that being complicit through one’s silence with
any kind of atrocity is hardly heroic.
People often go into trance when they are unwilling to look at themselves
and what they are doing. We all see this in organizations that are on a
slippery moral slope, where the unwritten rules say that whistle-blowers
will not be tolerated. People stay silent precisely because they know that
if they speak the truth, they will be scapegoated.
Moreover, while the healthy Hero tends to be careful to use violence only
as a last resort and with care to be certain that the real enemy is targeted,
the Hero in trance tends to act out the Hero story somewhat mindlessly.
That may help to explain why the administration rushed to attack Iraq before
the inspections were concluded, and why it was easy for it simply to substitute
an enemy with an address (Saddam) for one it could not find (bin Laden).
Indeed, it seems almost as if the Bush administration has forgotten bin
Laden entirely; the uncontested fact that the terrorists who flew into the
World Trade Center were from Saudi Arabia and had no connections with Iraq
now goes unmentioned.
When a trance is in play, the inevitable killing of civilians that happens
in modern wars is downplayed as “collateral damage,” and abuses
of prisoners are blamed on a few sadists far down the line. Citizens and
candidates who question such actions are discredited as unpatriotic, weak,
or wimpy. To the degree that we remain in trance, our detractors—in
Iran, in Europe, and at home—seem like villains. In trance, we are
permanently heroic—whatever we actually do.
It is not too late, however, for the Bush administration to break this trance—for
itself and the public. Bush has all the experience he needs—through
his knowledge of the global financial dealings of his family—to think
more complexly about foreign relations. Instead of hiding or deemphasizing
the fact that much of his family fortune comes from dealings with the Saudi
royal family and the bin Laden family, Bush needs to think about what his
interdependence with them means. He could recognize that the whole country
is in bed with these same people because we all are dependent on Middle
Eastern oil. And, of course, he could acknowledge that the U. S. trained
bin Laden, who was then our friend, to fight the Soviets, reflecting on
this and other historical tactics that have backfired.
If Bush would think about these issues for any sustained period of time,
he would understand that we are not living in the simple universe of the
1950s cowboy western. The world today is not made up of us and them. We
are all potentially us. Our lives are intertwined in ways that preclude
simple answers. And, no one permanently appointed us to be the good guys.
Like all individual human beings, the U. S. is imperfect and needs to learn
from its mistakes.
Not All Heroes Wear White Hats: Kerry and the Media
Kerry was a real Hero as a young man, both in the war and in opposing the
war upon his return. What is hopeful about Kerry is that he has seemed to
live that story in a healthy way and then grow, experiencing other archetypal
stories as well.
Kerry’s natural advantage, at this time in his life, would be to lead
with the Sage archetype, taking, as he does, a more complex and educated
approach to issues than we would expect in a Hero story. Even though Al
Gore did win the popular vote in 2000, Kerry’s advisers may have concluded
that Gore’s more scholarly, Sage-like affect is what kept him from
winning enough states to carry the electoral vote. Could it be that the
American people are so locked in a Hero trance that they see this as a negative?
Certainly Bush paints it as such.
Pollsters also might have advised the Kerry campaign that the American people
wanted a Hero. And, of course, his advisers were influenced by what seemed
like Kerry’s ace-in-the-hole war record. He was a real hero challenging
a president who sat out the Vietnam War and may have been AWOL during some
portion of his National Guard service. How could the American people prefer
to be defended by a man who partied through the war rather than one who
showed heroism both in the war and in the anti-war movement?
And, of course, Kerry was dealing with a news media in Hero trance, obsessed
with the horse race while avoiding digging into deeper policy issues. As
we were hurtling into the war in Iraq, news organizations were focusing
on how to brand their coverage of the war in ways that increased their ratings
or readership, rather than checking out the President’s reasoning
and sources. How do you introduce a new narrative when the news media itself
hears the news through the lens of only one story, and that story expressed
in its more stereotypical, shallow form, reported as sound bytes?
To the degree that the media are concerned primarily with ratings, they
become an arm of the entertainment industry. Wars are entertaining. Moreover,
when the Hero/Warrior mental model is evoked, everything is a contest. So,
we have dueling pundits hurling insults at one another rather than providing
in-depth coverage of the news. When the media cover attack ads, they treat
them all as if they were verbal grenades, analyzing how much damage they
inflict with only passing attention to whether or not a negative ad actually
is based on demonstrable truth. Suddenly, Kerry’s actions in Vietnam
are characterized as “disputed heroism,” even though military
records and eyewitnesses substantiate his version.
Given the current journalistic bent, it is difficult to get coverage of
issues presented in a complex and serious way, but Kerry would do the country
a service if he were to try. Kerry clearly has the experience—in the
Vietnam War, after the war, and in the Senate—to tell a story deeper
than the Hero narrative to the American people. If Kerry could talk with
the sincerity and passion of his testimony as a young returning veteran
before the Senate and combine that with the wisdom of experience over decades
in public life, he might be able to seduce Americans out of the trance and
the intellectual laziness it induces. I believe that he could—if he
would just take the risk to trust that we are up to the challenge.
Can Reporters be Real Journalists Again?
People and nations tend to stay in trance when they do not want to look
at themselves. But coming to grips with one’s own inadequacies is
part of what wise individuals do as they mature. Facing and learning from
one’s failures is a prerequisite to developing real wisdom. If we
can do this as individuals, certainly our country can, too. We tend to see
the enormous virtues we have as a country, but often miss our shortcomings.
Of course, others see them. A study released in March by the Pew Foundation
tells us that many of our allies—in the Middle East and in Europe—now
have negative images of us, and that this was much less true just four years
ago. If we hope to regain our prestige in the world, we have to be willing
to see ourselves as others see us and learn from their perceptions. Rather
than making fun of the French and other allies, or demonizing the entire
Islamic world, it would be wise for us to pay attention to why we are perceived
so negatively. Perhaps others are aware of factors we are not tracking,
and maybe there are also ways we need to change.
The good news is that facing facts, rather than living a false story, increases
our ability to recognize and solve problems. The news media easily could
help the country out of trance by doing what psychotherapists do to help
individuals locked in a counterproductive story.